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Available online 19 September 2016This opinion article explores how sustained neural ﬁring in association areas allows high-ordermental represen-
tations to be coactivated over multiple perception-action cycles, permitting sequential mental states to share
overlapping content and thus be recursively interrelated. The term “state-spanning coactivity” (SSC) is intro-
duced to refer to neural nodes that remain coactive as a group over a given period of time. SSC ensures that con-
textual groupings of goal or motor-relevant representations will demonstrate continuous activity over a delay
period. It also allows potentially related representations to accumulate and coactivate despite delays between
their initial appearances. The nodes that demonstrate SSC are a subset of the active representations from the pre-
vious state, and can act as referents to which newly introduced representations of succeeding states relate. Coac-
tive nodes pool their spreading activity, converging on and activating new nodes, adding these to the remaining
nodes from the previous state. Thus, the overall distribution of coactive nodes in cortical networks evolves grad-
ually during contextual updating. The term “incremental change in state-spanning coactivity” (icSSC) is intro-
duced to refer to this gradual evolution. Because a number of associated representations can be sustained
continuously, each brain state is embedded recursively in the previous state, amounting to an iterative process
that can implement learned algorithms to progress toward a complex result. The longer representations are
sustained, the more successive mental states can share related content, exhibit progressive qualities, implement
complex algorithms, and carry thematic or narrative continuity. Included is a discussion of the implications that
SSC and icSSC may have for understanding working memory, deﬁning consciousness, and constructing AI
architectures.This is an open© 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Keywords:
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Working memory1. Introduction
The present article will delineate a simplistic but previously
overlooked nonlinear dynamic pattern of brain activity. Two hypothet-
ical constructs are introduced to describe this pattern. The ﬁrst con-
struct is state-spanning coactivity (SSC), which occurs when cortical
nodes exhibit sustained coactivity during the span of short-term mem-
ory. The gradual evolution of SSC exhibits a distinctive spatiotemporalaccess article under tpattern of turnover as it plays out in real time. The second construct in-
troduced here, incremental change in state-spanning coactivity (icSSC),
refers to this pattern of turnover. icSSC conveys that the set of nodes
that are simultaneously coactive changes incrementally as newly acti-
vated nodes are added and others are deactivatedwhile a distinct subset
remains in SSC. Spreading activity from the nodes in SSC select: 1) inac-
tive neural nodes for activation, 2) active nodes for deactivation, and 3)
active nodes for sustained activation. Because a distinct subset of nodes
is always conserved from one brain state to the next, each state is em-
bedded recursively in the previous state, amounting to an iterative pro-
cess that has the potential to progress algorithmically toward a complexhe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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tative model delineating the theoretical functions of SSC and icSSC from
the perspective of cognitive neuroscience.
The term SSC can be used either to denote a property or to designate
a set of neurons. icSSC denotes a property or process (Table 1). Both are
related to the construct of working memory, which is deﬁned as a sys-
tem responsible for the transient holding and processing of attended in-
formation. The fundamental assumption made by this article is that the
content of working memory can be said to be in SSC; and as working
memory progresses over time, the content can be said to exhibit icSSC.
This assumption is applied not only to working memory as the same
could be said of attention, consciousness or short-term memory. icSSC
can be taken to be the underlying neural substrate of mental continuity.
As proposed here, mental continuity is a process where a gradually
changing collection of mental representations held in attention/work-
ing memory emerges from the icSSC of neural nodes. The thematic
and narrative quality created by this continuity during internally gener-
ated thought may be largely congruent with key facets of conscious ex-
perience. In the course of exploring how neural continuity creates
mental continuity, this article will attempt to integrate current theoret-
ical approaches while remaining consistent with prevailing knowledge.
Animals are information-processing agents. They receive unpro-
cessed data through sensory receptors, expose it to a massively parallel
network of nodes and channels, and allow the interaction between the
activity and the existing network to determine behavior. Even small in-
vertebrateswith elementary nervous systems exhibit ongoing, internal-
ly generated neural activity that temporarily biases the network
weights. Because it involves mechanisms that include sustained ﬁring,
this continuous endogenous processing constitutes a ﬂeeting form of
SSC, even in animals like thenematode and fruitﬂy. In vertebrates, how-
ever, SSC involves the coactivation of high-level representations from
long-termmemorywithin a single, massively interconnected represen-
tational network (telencephalon). Each such representation is a record
of the distribution of past neural activity corresponding to a recogniz-
able stimulus or motor pattern. An instantaneous attentional state is
composed of a novel combination of these template-like representa-
tions which together create contextual, cognitive content. Themamma-
lian neocortex can hold a number of such mnemonic representations
coactive for hundreds of milliseconds, using them to make predictions
by allowing them to spread their activation energy together, throughout
the thalamocortical network. This activation energy converges on the
inactive representations in long-termmemory that are themost closely
connected with the current group of active representations, making
them active and pulling them into SSC. Thus, new representations join
the representations that recruited them, are incorporated into the set
of coactive parameters in SSC and used in subsequent searches.
When the activity of certain nodes can be sustained for several sec-
onds at a time, as in primate association cortex, the complexity of search
in such a system increases. Highly sustained activity allows prioritized
representations to act as search parameters for multiple perception-ac-
tion cycles. This permits more dynamic icSSC, whereby goal-relevant
representations can be held constant as others are allowed to change.Table 1
Deﬁnition of key terms.
Instantaneous coactivity The coactivity of a set of cortical nodes in a
single instant or state.
State-spanning coactivity (SSC) Sustained coactivity exhibited by a set of two
or more cortical nodes that spans two or more
consecutive brain states.
Incremental change in
state-spanning coactivity (icSSC)
The process in which a set of three or more
neural nodes exhibiting SSC undergoes a shift
in group membership, where at least two
nodes remain in SSC and at least one is
deactivated and replaced by a new node.
Mental continuity The recursive interrelatedness of consecutive
mental states made possible by icSSC.The icSSC taking place in association areas allows task-pertinent repre-
sentations to bemaintained overmultiple cycles, in order to direct com-
plex sequences of interrelated mental states. The individual states in a
sequence of such states can be considered interrelated because they
share representational content. The associations linking these se-
quences are saved tomemory, impacting future searches and ultimately
permitting semantic knowledge, planning, and systemizing.
2. Sustained ﬁring, attentional updating, and memory decay
Mammals regularly encounter scenarios involving sets of stimuli
that may remain present (or relevant) throughout the experience. In
order to systemize such a scenario, it may be necessary to maintain
mental representations of the pertinent contextual stimuli during the
experience, and even afterward. Mammalian brains are well-equipped
to do exactly this. The glutamatergic pyramidal neurons in the prefron-
tal cortex (PFC), parietal cortex, and other association cortices, are spe-
cialized for sustained ﬁring, allowing them to generate action potentials
at elevated rates for several seconds at a time [35]. In contrast, neurons
in other brain areas, including cortical sensory areas, often remain per-
sistently active for periods of mere milliseconds unless sustained input
from either the environment or association areasmakes their continued
activity possible [35]. A neuronmay exhibit tonic sustained ﬁring due to
temporary changes in the strength of certain synapses (short-term syn-
aptic modiﬁcation [80]), its intrinsic biophysical properties, extrinsic
circuit properties (reverberatory circuits), or dopaminergic innervation
[25]. Prolonged activity of neurons in association areas is largely
thought to allow the maintenance of speciﬁc features, patterns and
goals [8].
Goldman-Rakic [37,38] ﬁrst suggested that the phenomenon of
sustained ﬁring in the PFC is responsible for the information mainte-
nance capabilities of the temporary storage buffers of workingmemory.
Goldman-Rakic [39] also proposed that the PFC is parceled into several
specialized regions, each of which is responsible for detecting,
representing and sustaining a different extraction of multimodal infor-
mation. Since then, the PFC, along with a number of association areas,
has been divided into increasingly smaller modules, each with unique
receptive/projective ﬁelds and functional properties including faculties
such as short-term spatial memory, short-term semantic memory, re-
sponse switching, error detection, reward anticipation, impulse sup-
pression, and many others. Working memory, executive processing
and cognitive control are now widely thought to stem from the active
maintenance of patterns of activity in the PFC, especially the dorsolater-
al PFC, that correspond to goal-relevant features and patterns [33,34].
The temporary persistence of these patterns ensures that they continue
to transmit their effects on network weights as long as they remain ac-
tive, biasing ongoing processing, and affecting the interpretation of
stimuli that occur during their episode of continual ﬁring [57]. This per-
sistence ensures that context from the recent past is taken into account
during action selection.
During any experience, some neural nodes exhibit more prolonged
sustained ﬁring than others. I will assume that in general the most en-
duringly active nodes correspond to what attention is most focused
on, or the underlying theme that remains most constant as other con-
textual features change. From subjective introspection we know that
whenwe envision a scenario in our mind's eye, we often notice it trans-
form into a related but distinctly different scenario [46]. These two sce-
narios are related because our brain is capable of icSSC. In other words,
the distribution of active neurons in the brain transﬁgures incremental-
ly from one conﬁguration to another, instead of changing all at once. If it
were not for the phenomenon of icSSC, instantaneous information pro-
cessing states would be time-locked and isolated (as in most serial and
parallel computing architectures), rather than continuous with the
states before and after them.
These observations point to the notion that every cortical state is
composed of a subset of elements from the previous state, and also
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before that. In fact, when comparing successive cortical states, the
shorter the time difference between two states (on the order of seconds
to fractions of milliseconds), the more similar in composition the two
states will be. For instance, over the span of 10milliseconds, a relatively
large proportion of nodes will exhibit uninterrupted coactivity; howev-
er, over 10 s, this proportionwill bemuch smaller. Here, wewill be con-
cernedwith neural nodes exhibiting SSC at two distinct levels: A) short-
term memory/priming, i.e., elements of long-term memory activated
above baseline (for seconds to minutes); and B) the focus of attention/
immediate memory, i.e., a small, perhaps more active subset of A (for
milliseconds to a few seconds). Items in SSC within the focus of atten-
tion likely demonstrate active neural binding whereas items in SSC
within short-term memory may not.
Mental continuity and icSSC require a densely interconnected repre-
sentational system such as a neural network that is capable of holding
two or more representations (each specifying discrete and separate in-
formational content) active over the course of two or more points in
time (Fig. 1). The sustained activity of a single representation over
time does not provide any context or associative/relational content,
and so should not be taken to be sufﬁcient for mental continuity. More
than one representation is needed. Although its limits are presently
being debated, the human neocortex is clearly capable of holding nu-
merous representations active over numerous points in time.
In Fig. 1 above, representations B, C, D, and E are active during t1, and
C, D, E and F are active during t2. Thus representations C, D, and E dem-
onstrate SSC because they exhibit continuous and uninterrupted activi-
ty from t1 through t2. The brain state at t1 and the brain state at t2 share
C, D, and E in common and therefore can be expected to share other
commonalities such as: similar information processing operations, sim-
ilar memory search parameters, similar mental imagery, similar cogni-
tive and declarative aspects, and similar experiential and phenomenal
characteristics. The active nodes that have demonstrated SSC over any
speciﬁc time interval can be thought of as constituting a unit with emer-
gent functional properties. Together, these nodes impose sustained in-
formation processing demands on the lower-order sensory and motorFig. 1. Schematic depiction of icSSC in the focus of attention. Each bracket represents the active
cortical area where the representation is active. Red brackets denote representations that have
brackets denote representations that have not been sustained. In time sequence 1, representa
D and E have remained active, and F is newly active. The ﬁgure depicts a system with SSC be
one point in time (t1 and t2). The ﬁgure depicts icSSC because the removal of B and addition oareas within the reach of their long-range connections. The longer the
activity in these higher-order neurons is sustained, the longer they re-
main engaged in hierarchy-spanning, recurrent (and reentrant) broad-
casting throughout the cortex and subcortex.
Compared to those of othermammals, human association areas con-
tain more neurons, more intrinsic and extrinsic connections, and a
higher capacity for sustained ﬁring [33,34]. These characteristics pre-
sumably permit us to retain more information, for a longer time before
it decays. This likely allows humans to better retain elements from
recent thoughts, and allows the computational results of previous
processes to more thoroughly inform subsequent ones. This once inﬂu-
enced the present author to assume that somehow thoughts are “lon-
ger” in humans than they are in other animals; however, if thought
has an architectural geometry marked by length, then mustn't it also
have starting and stopping points? If persistent activity of individual
representations in SSC is staggered and overlapping, then there cannot
be objective stopping or starting points of thought. Instead, thought it-
self must be composed of the startings and stoppings of huge numbers
of individual elements that could be depicted graphically in the form
of a continuous, stream-like distribution (Fig. 2). Therefore, it is not
that human thoughts are somehow longer than in other animals; rather,
human thought is composed of larger sets of representations that are
capable of remaining coactivated longer [70,71].
The reallocation of processing resources in Fig. 2 is similar to the be-
havior of treads on a military tank. Individual treads are continually
placed on the ground temporarily, and the treads that have sat on the
ground for the longest are withdrawn in series. The total set of treads
touching the ground in one moment partially overlaps with the total
set in the next. Our mental set of active representations may cycle in
an analogous, although more ﬂexible and stochastic manner. A more
precise analogy and schematic will be introduced in Section 5.
PFC neurons are likely tuned throughout life to best determinewhat
aspects of the present environment should bemaintained in SSC (or re-
leased from maintenance) given the current scenario and its preceding
circumstances.When confronted with a complex conﬁguration of stim-
uli, the PFC may select the representations that it “predicts” should betime span of a representation. The x-axis represents time, and the y-axis demarcates the
exhibited uninterrupted activity from the point when they became active, whereas blue
tions B, C, D and E have remained active until t1. In time sequence 2, B has deactivated, C,
cause more than one representation (C, D, and E) has been maintained over more than
f F were incremental and did not disrupt the SSC of C, D and E.
Fig. 2. A simpliﬁed schematic representation of icSSC depicting it as a gradually shifting, stream-like distribution. This ﬁgure extends Fig. 1 over ﬁve time intervals revealing a repeating
pattern: remnants of the preceding state are consistently carried over to the next state. If this distributional plot were modeling neurons rather than representations, there might be
millions of units per time period rather than four; however, this fundamental reoccurring pattern would remain.
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ture. This selection process is likely determined by the incoming stimu-
lus conﬁguration itself, prior probability as encoded in the network, and
the network-biasing representations already in SSC. Initially during de-
velopment, the process of selecting neurons for persistent activity may
be random and heavily inﬂuenced by innate connectivity. The expertise
of the PFC is probably garnered slowly, over developmental time, after
connections between groups of neurons exhibiting sustained ﬁring are
strengthened for their role in mediating task proﬁciency and reward
achievement. The selection process for SSC is perhaps best exempliﬁed
by the ability to identify andmaintain strategically important represen-
tations from a forthcoming scenario. A sentence (spoken orwritten) is a
suitable example. A sentence will be comprehended if: 1) the relevant
representations are identiﬁed and enter into SSC; 2) all the necessary
representations are sustained throughout the duration of the sentence;
3) the network has enough experience with this particular combination
of representations to build the appropriate imagery, depicting them in
the way they were intended. Most people have had the experience
where either the wrong representations were anchored upon, or the
right representations could not be maintained for long enough, and
the sentence had to be repeated or reread.
The quantity of SSC can be thought of as directly proportional to the
number of sustained nodes and the average length of time of their activ-
ity [69–71]. It should also be possible, in theory, to quantify icSSC by de-
termining the proportion of previously active neural nodes that have
remained active over a given time period. One way to do this would
be to determine how long it takes half of the currently ﬁring association
neurons to sufﬁciently reduce their ﬁring. Employing the idea of a “half-
life”may be a useful concept even though the “decaying quantity”may
not exhibit constant exponential decay, and despite the fact that current
scanning and recording methods could not produce the necessary data
without signiﬁcant extrapolation. If the average rate of decay was prop-
erly operationally deﬁned and could be measured, then cognitive neu-
roscientists would be able to discuss the “icSSC half-life” associated
with individuals or even species. Would it be informative if it were
found thatWistar rats have an average icSSC half-life of, say, one second,
macaque monkeys twice this and humans twice that? Even in a single
individual, this number is likely to vary depending on the task at
hand, level of arousal, motivational state, brain oscillation factors, and
brain regions assayed. Moreover, short-term memory/priming would
have a much longer half-life than the focus of attention. An SSC/icSSCproﬁle featuring numerous such assays could be computed for an indi-
vidual based on various standardized criteria. If characterized correctly
and averagedmeaningfully, these numbers could prove to be consistent
and reliable psychometric markers. Tononi [83] developed amethod for
calculating a measure of “integrated information”within a single, static
brain state. The concept of icSSC could be used to expand on this mea-
sure in order to calculate the integration of information between two
brain states, or across multiple brain states.
It is not always the case that themajority of representations are con-
served from one thought to the next. When they become a lower prior-
ity, nearly all items in the focus of attention can be displaced at the same
time. This readily happens when we are exposed to a new, salient, per-
haps emotionally laden stimulus.Whenever a person loses their train of
thought, and forgetswhat theywere just thinking, SSC in the focus of at-
tention (though not necessarily in short-term memory) is interrupted.
SSC “jumps,” reallocating attentional resources, and reorienting to the
new stimulus conﬁguration and its accompanying set of features. Such
a jumpwould constitute a disruption of, or ﬂuctuation in, mental conti-
nuity. The degree of ﬂuctuation in continuity varies depending on the
proportion of neural activity that is abruptly deactivated (Fig. 3). Be-
cause icSSC is the change in SSC, as attention shifts, SSC decreases, and
icSSC increases.
In themost intelligentmammals, latemotor output and early senso-
ry activity are heavily inﬂuenced by several seconds of sustained input
from association areas. In mammals with smaller association areas, ca-
pable of less SSC, motor and sensory output are informed by a much
briefer window of continuous activity. High SSC likely allows “behavior-
al continuity”where sequential behaviors can be complexly interrelated
and mutually informed. This can be contrasted with the more isolated
and impulsive behaviors seen in individuals with injuries to the PFC
(i.e., ﬁeld-dependent behavior in which the patient's behavior is
dictated by incidental cues and distractions). In fact, the temporal extent
of SSC may be a major facet of the “general factor” of intelligence. SSC
may be related to, and a primary determinant of, attention span,
behavioral ﬂexibility, working memory capacity, short-term memory
capacity, reasoning ability, and general ﬂuid intelligence. Furthermore,
signiﬁcant individual differences in SSCmay exist in humanswhere def-
icits in this capacity may map onto a variety of clinical syndromes such
as schizophrenia, mental retardation, cognitive aging, chronic stress,
various forms of intoxication, and prefrontal injury. Nevertheless, why
did SSC and icSSC evolve, what purposes do they serve, and how do
Fig. 3. This ﬁgure expands on Fig. 2 by comparing four possible incremental changes in SSC. In the ﬁrst transition 75% of representational continuity ismaintained between time periods 1
and 2. The other transitions depict 50%, 25%, and 0%maintenance of continuity respectively. According to the deﬁnition ofmental continuity, neither the graphic marked “25% continuity”
nor the one marked “0% continuity” depict mental continuity, because they do not feature the maintenance of more than one representation.
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the capacity to sustain certain representations so that hypothetical
groupings of representations could be modeled and systemized.
2.1. Dopamine, task-relevance, and contextual modeling
The dopamine (DA) system exerts complex actions within several
interrelated systems of the mammalian brain: motor function, motiva-
tion, reward attention, learning, and delayed response [33,34]. DA sent
from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) modulates the activity and
timing of sustained neural ﬁring in the PFC, association cortices, and
elsewhere [76]. DA neurotransmission in the PFC is thought to underlie
the ability to internally represent, maintain, and update contextual
information [11]. Given this role, the mesocortical DA system, and the
systems onwhich it acts are likely to be heavily involved inmental con-
tinuity. Widespread projections from prefrontal areas are thought to
utilize DA to regulate the transmission of incoming stimuli from sensory
areas, suppressing irrelevant stimuli and enhancing relevant ones [73].
DA may serve a “gating” function in the PFC, regulating the selection
of task-relevant information and non-routine actions in the face of in-
terference from (potentially stronger) task-irrelevant information and
routine impulses [9,57]. Relevant actions and perceptions must be
actively sustained in SSC so that information related to the context
surrounding behavioral goals can bias behavior and perception over
temporally extended periods.
DA/PFC system activity ﬂuctuates with environmental demand [32].
The system is engaged by prediction error, when reward or punishment
contingencies change. Novel appetitive and aversive events have been
shown to increase dopamine release in the VTA, causing sustained ﬁring
of PFC neurons [75]. Thus, emotional areas like the nucleus accumbens
and the amygdala help to structure the progression of thought by deter-
mining what elements remain in SSC the longest. Even in mice, DA
levels often remain high for a duration far longer than that of the expe-
rience itself. Seamans and Robbins [75] elaborated a functionalexplanation. They have stated that the DA system is phasically activated
in response to novel rewards and punishments because it is adaptive for
the animal to anchor upon and further process unpredicted opportuni-
ties and dangers even after the experience itself has ended.
How does simply holding a suite of related representations in SSC
allow the animal tomake useful associative inferences? The representa-
tions in memory for the component parts of the experience coactivate,
spreading their activation energy in an attempt to converge on and ac-
tivate historically associated representations that are not found in the
experience itself [70]. Becausememory traces for important features re-
main active and primed, they can probably be used repeatedly as spec-
iﬁcations that guide the generation of apposite mental imagery in other
processing modules, such as the phonological loop and visuospatial
sketchpad [70,71].
It is probable that a succession of lower-order topographic images or
maps created in sensory processing modules depict and explore hypo-
thetical, causal relationships between the higher-order, top-down spec-
iﬁcations held in SSC. Consecutive topographic images may model the
scenario because some of the contextual elements are held constant
while others are allowed to change. The fact that newly activated search
terms are combined with search terms from the previous cycle makes
this process demonstrate qualities of progressive iteration. This allows
the important search terms to “work” actively with newly introduced
terms in a systematic effort to interrogate the nature of the situation
being simulated.
The present article intends to further explore how icSSC enables
mental modeling through the mediation of the relationship between
the high-order representations held in working memory and the low-
order topographic content of sensory modules. First, however, we
should make an effort to identify the neurobiological units of SSC. In
the present paradigm, two neural units are proposed: assemblies (pre-
viously referred to here as nodes) and ensembles (previously referred to
as representations). Both of these demonstrate SSC at different levels of
granularity.
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The present model is consistent with connectionism and parallel
distributed processing in that it conceptualizes cortical architecture
as a plurality of densely interconnected networks composed of
decentralized, semi-hierarchically organized, pattern-recognizing
nodes that have multiple inputs and outputs [41,47]. Like many biolog-
ically plausible neural network models, it envisions these nodes as mi-
croscopic, modular neural units in the cerebral cortex and assumes
that each individual unit represents an elementary feature or stable
“microrepresentation” of long-term memory [43,55,87]. Like other
models (e.g., [20,59]), this model views cognition as a system responsi-
ble for using active representations from long-term memory to guide
goal-directed processing [66]. This is, in some ways, consistent with
Fuster's [35] concept of cognits—distributed itemsof knowledge deﬁned
by patterns of connections between neuron populations associated
through experience. Fuster emphasized that his cognits are hierarchi-
cally organized, link noncontiguous neurons, overlap, and interconnect
profusely.Wewill assume that to build a higher-ordermental represen-
tation, the cortex must combine a subset of the numerous, fragmentary
lower-order units at its disposal into an improvised composite. In this
model, all high-order mental states are constrained in that they can be
built only from combinations of preexisting lower-order units.
The fundamental unit of cognition may comprise a number of simi-
larly tuned neurons that are synaptically bound to create a functionally
discrete assembly [51]. These have been called “cognitive building
blocks,” “lego-like” elements, and “cognitive atoms” [65]. Because the
neurons of such an assembly share highly similar receptive ﬁelds, the
assembly responds to a particular “preferred” aspect of the environ-
ment, and can be said to have a unique although primitive “window
on the world.” An assembly is maximally activated when the simulta-
neous ﬁring of a sufﬁcient subset of its inputs converges upon it [31].
In general, when an assembly becomes active, the subsymbolic pattern
that it represents has been recognized and it communicates this recog-
nition with the assemblies that it is connected to through its outputs.
Thus, the assemblies, like the neurons that compose them, recognize
conjunctions and function as “coincidence detectors” or “pattern recog-
nition nodes.” More intelligent mammals likely: 1) have a larger num-
ber of available assemblies in the cortex to select from, 2) coactivate a
larger number of assemblies simultaneously, and 3) have the capacity
to prolong the activation of goal-relevant assemblies for extended
periods.
Minicolumns of cells in the cortex are strong candidates for these
hypothetical assemblies because they are somewhat spatially distinct,
contain neurons with qualitatively similar receptive ﬁelds, span each
of the cortical layers, and communicate with each other as well as
with subcortical structures. Neurons are inelegant candidates for
these building blocks because, despite the fact that each neuron has a
distinct and singular receptive ﬁeld, their functional properties vary
widely depending on cell type and the layer in which they are found.
Hypercolumns are also not good candidates, as they can be divided
into subunits with receptive ﬁelds that are qualitatively different or
mutually inhibitory [44].
It is unlikely that individual cell assemblies represent consciously
perceptible constructs. We will refer to a coalition of assemblies that
acts as an engram for a whole consciously perceptible construct as an
“ensemble.” Ensembles are congruent with the “representations”
discussed earlier. Ensembles in association areas encode invariant,
high-order representations such as objects, people, places, rules and
concepts as well as the propositions that deﬁne the nature of the rela-
tionships between these. An ensemble is composed of cortical assem-
blies that have become highly connected in a Hebbian manner owing
to approximately simultaneous activity in the past. Ensembles encode
statistical, combinatorial information about the most frequently con-
comitant features of a reoccurring stimulus conﬁguration. Ensembles
in frontal cortex will be taken to encode information involving actions,from discrete muscle-driven movements in premotor cortex to
intended behaviors in motor association cortex. In this formulation, en-
sembles exist within association areas but not within primary sensory
or motor areas, because a single construct can take countless neural in-
stantiations in primary areas as neurons here do not capture invariance.
It is unclear exactly what the neural organization of an ensemble is,
but perhaps they can take many forms owing to the vast number of
different types of representations that can be held in the numerous
specialized modules of the brain. I expect that ensembles are not static
but instead are constantly transmuted as additional information is
injected into them during the top-down, bottom-up and horizontal
reciprocations between functional regions. For instance, as a person
thinks about a concept, only a particular subset of assemblies that are
ordinarily statistically associated with this concept will be active. In a
sense, an ensemble is continually ﬂeshing out but never completely
encompassing the concept (or Platonic ideal) that it embodies. Such a
higher-order map could be referred to as a “macroensemble.” This
conceptualization of an ensemble is highly theoretical, but it will allow
us to continue in our systematization.
A single assembly probably does not form a crucial part of an ensem-
ble to which it belongs, and surely must contribute to multiple ensem-
bles. An ensemble may be composed of other ensembles, although an
assembly cannot be composed of other assemblies.When an assembly's
neurons are targeted by a bombardment of excitatory post-synaptic po-
tentials, this will lead to the “ignition” of the assembly: cells within the
input layers become excited enough to activate the assembly's pyrami-
dal projection neurons, causing it to ﬁre out rapidly to the cells of other
assemblies in the cortex. Ensembles may ignite autoassociatively after a
sufﬁcient number of their assemblies have been targeted. When a new
ensemble is converged upon, it brings a new representation into SSC.
In the present model, all active assemblies contribute to processing in
a highly interconnected cortical workspace. This processing involves
the currently active assemblies pooling their activation energy in
order to converge on the most closely associated, task-appropriate
ensembles.
3.1. Spreading activation, the cortical workspace, and polyassociativity
The manner in which assemblies and ensembles are selected for
activity in this model is consistent with spreading activation theory.
According to this theory, associative networks can be searched by
labeling a set of source nodes, which then spread their activation energy
to closely associated nodes [17]. Here, the propagation of activation en-
ergy is passed among assemblies and follows weighted links. The links
are found in the axons and dendrites, and the weights are found in the
synapses. Several alternate paths through these links can reach the
same end assembly.When enough of these links excite the same assem-
bly, it is activated. Unlike subcortical areas, information processing in
the cortex is not compartmentalized into individual nuclei that are rel-
atively isolated fromprocessing occurring elsewhere. Rather, the spread
of activity in the cortex is thought to involve many-to-one (conver-
gence) and one-to-many (divergence) interactions within a massively
interconnected network of assemblies [55]. Because hippocampal-de-
pendent processes impose an additional degree of complexity on the se-
lection of cortical assemblies in SSC, they will be ignored here in the
interest of simpliﬁcation.
Cortical assemblies work cooperatively by spreading the activation
energy (both excitatory and inhibitory) necessary to converge upon
the next set of ensembles that will be coactivated with the remaining
ensembles from the previous cycle. This pooling of activity during the
coactivation of multiple assemblies, and the manner that new ensem-
bles are selected for entry into the cortical workspace, will be referred
to as “polyassociativity.” This term may be apt because the next repre-
sentational addition to thought is converged upon bymultiple associat-
ed speciﬁers from the previous state. One ensemble does not activate
the next in linear sequence. Rather, several assemblies/ensembles are
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energy to determine which assemblies/ensembles will be activated
next in a nonlinear yet mechanistic manner. Table 2 demonstrates
how active, subsymbolic representations work together to select sym-
bolic representations, resulting in a self-perpetuating “stream” or
“train” of thought that demonstrates icSSC.
The brain employs a blind heuristic, summoning up the long-term
memory fragments that are most probabilistically related to the cur-
rently active set of fragments. Thus, polyassociativity is an automatic
and unconscious form of pattern completion that could ultimately be
responsible for, not only the execution of automatic associations in an
unconscious processing stream, but also sudden insight and even
“deliberate” declarative associations. From a subjective perspective,
the contents of our next thought are chosen for us based on how the
currently active assemblies interact with the existing neuro-/nomolog-
ical network. The current state will “fall” deterministically into the next
most probable or stable state according to the prevailing neurophysio-
logical conditions. Many authors favor the idea of “selﬁsh,” “rivalrous”
assemblies that compete with each other for activation energy. Howev-
er, it may be equally appropriate to view them as “patient,” “democrat-
ic” assemblies that wait until enough of their peers signal them before
they become active. Furthermore, they are “cooperative” in the sense
that they work together to spread activation energy.
Fig. 4 depicts workingmemory as the interaction between icSSC and
polyassociativity. Working memory utilizes polyassociativity to select
the representations that will be maintained in SSC in the service of
memory recall and behavioral control. In this ﬁgure, the letters repre-
sent ensembles held in association areas and are largely congruent
with the items or chunks that can be held in a limited capacity in
working memory. Four ensembles are used after Cowan's four chunks
(1995). In time sequence 1 of Fig. 4, the assemblies that comprise
ensembles B, C, D and E are each individually associated with a very
large number of ensembles, but as a group they are most closely associ-
atedwith ensemble F. This is analogous to the event where together the
words “radioactive,” “nylon,” “arthropod” and “responsibility” may
together prompt the recollection of “Spiderman,” yet none of the
words alone would be sufﬁcient.
In Fig. 4, between time periods 1 and 2, C, D and E exhibit SSC,
whereas, between time periods 1 and 3, only C and E exhibit SSC. C
and E are active over all three time periods, meaning that these repre-
sentations are being used as search function parameters formultiple cy-
cles, and are likely the subject of attention. When we are motivated to
think about the relationship between two concepts, the ensembles for
these concepts may remain active as other ensembles ﬁlter in and out.
Alternatively, we can imagine a scenario where B, C, D, and E from
step one of Fig. 3 were immediately replaced by F, G, H, and I. Such a
processing system may still be using previous states to determine
subsequent states; however, because no activity is sustained over
time, there would be no continuity in such a system. This is generally
how standard, von Neumann computing systems operate, using rule-
based symbolic processing to execute serial instructions. Even in
contemporary artiﬁcial neural networks, recursion marked by icSSC
and polyassociativity are not harnessed for information processing.Table 2
Determinants of polyassociativity.
Gradual additions to and subtractions from a pool of simultaneously coactivated
ensembles occur as:
1. Assemblies that continue to receive sufﬁcient activation energy from the network
are maintained;
2. Assemblies that receive sufﬁciently reduced activation energy, or are inhibited,
are deactivated;
3. New assemblies, which are tuned to receive sufﬁcient activation energy from
the currently coactive assemblies, are converged upon, and incorporated into
the remaining pool of active assemblies from the previous cycle;
4. The ensembles that most closely correspond to the constellation of presently
coactive assemblies are recalled autoassociatively.In Fig. 4, ensembles C and E have ﬁred together over three individual
time intervals, and thus will show a propensity to wire together, in-
creasing their propensity to ﬁre together in the future. It is more likely,
however, that they will recruit one another if the other contextual en-
sembles are also active. Thus, after the events depicted in Fig. 4, C and
E aremore likely to ﬁre together in the future, especially if accompanied
by B, D, F and G. Thismay allowmammals to associate two concepts but
only within the context of the other concepts that ﬁred with them his-
torically. The association between C and E will become increasingly
less speciﬁc, as they ﬁre together with more ensembles not included
in Fig. 4. The associations between cortical ensembles that are made
during a brief episodic event are only slightly strengthened during
encoding and the long-term potentiation (LTP) that accompanies it.
Coincidental or rare associations between the ensembles of a single ex-
perience are probably mostly lost from non-hippocampal-dependent
cortical memory. However, reoccurring associations are heavily
encoded, persist as semantic knowledge, andmay come to underpin be-
liefs and habitual behaviors. Statistical codependencies between en-
sembles start early in cortical development when an infant coactivates
ensembles for perceptual stimuli with ensembles for: 1) other tempo-
rally proximate stimuli, 2) innate responses to these stimuli, and 3)
the environmental outcomes of these responses.
Polyassociativitymay be able to informour understanding of the for-
mation of some types of implicit memory. When a group of ensembles
becomes coactive and converges on a new representation, the ensem-
bles have a propensity to wire together. This strengthening of the
group of ensembles is likely to allow a subset of them to activate the en-
semble that previously required them all. In Fig. 4, B, C, D, E and F might
become so strongly bound that only three of the fourmight be sufﬁcient
to activate F henceforth. Thus, some ensembles need not be present in
SSC, and can become implicit in this process. We are probably often un-
aware of the statistical regularities in our environment that underlie
why some coactivates can be omitted without consequence. If B, C, D,
and E were to converge on F, strengthened associations among these
representations may make it possible, for instance, for C, D, E and F to
converge on B. In essence, associative cognitionmay stem from the abil-
ity of discrete neural ensembles to sensitize (and habituate) to one an-
other during group coactivation. Coactive ensembles likely fuse or
differentiate their respective maps depending on whether their active
connections are excitatory or inhibitory. We often have two completely
unrelated thoughts in quick succession, and surely elements from both
will remain coactive in SSC. Because of this, the brain must have neural
mechanisms to ensure that ensembles which appear close together in
time, and are exposed to one another, do not wire together unless
they have some logical connection that was formed within the focus
of attention. The brainmay use a combination of dopaminergic process-
es, binding processes, and/or molecular tagging processes, to accom-
plish this.
Polyassociativity allows the introduction of a hypothetical phenom-
enon referred to here as a “novel convergence event.” A novel conver-
gence event occurs when ensembles B, C, D and E have each
individually and repeatedly contributed to the ﬁring of node F in the
past, although they have never ﬁred all together as a group to activate
F, until now. This amounts to a pseudo-Hebbian form of convergence
that may be prevalent in the brain. For instance, we may have never
seen the trivia prompt “The name of a planet, an element, and a
Roman god,” but each of the clues may contribute independently to un-
conscious neural convergence onto the ensemble representing the con-
struct of “mercury.” It is the present author's belief that most thought is
driven byheuristic approximations. In otherwords, the cortex constant-
ly spreads activation energy from novel combinations of active ensem-
bles that have never been coactive before, and attempts to converge
upon the statistically most relevant association without certain or
exact precedence, resulting in a solution that is subject to recall errors
and is not guaranteed to be optimal. Optimality could be approached
if a speciﬁc group of ensembles (say, C and E) have been thoroughly
Fig. 4. Schematic depicting “polyassociativity” and illustrating the ways in which high-level representations (chunks, ensembles) are maintained, displaced, and newly activated. 1)
Representation A has already been deactivated and B, C, D and E are coactivated, mirroring the pattern of activity shown in Fig. 1. When coactivated, these representations pool and
spread their activation energy, resulting in the convergence of activity onto a new representation, F. Once F becomes active, it immediately becomes a coactivate, restarting the cycle.
2) B has been deactivated, while C, D, E, and F are coactivated and G is newly activated. 3) D but not C, has been deactivated. Thus, what is deactivated is not necessarily what entered
ﬁrst but what receives the least converging activity. C, E, F, and G coactivate and converge on H.
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cepts has developed due to either extensive operant conditioning, men-
tal modeling, or a combination of both.
There are at least two components that could exhibit natural varia-
tion in such a system: 1) the temporary storage capacity, and 2) the
temporal duration of storage. Fig. 4 features four representations for
the former, and four time periods per representation for the latter. The
storage capacity probably remains relatively constant over time, where-
as as attention shifts, the storage durationmay shrink to zero in order to
accommodate a new set of activates. If the number of items that can be
held in the temporary storage capacity were increased to 5, and A, B, C,
D, and E coactivated simultaneously, this could change the network dy-
namics such that node F might no longer be the node upon which the
system converged. This could also be the case if the capacity were to
shrink to 3 items rather than 4. Altering capacity or duration may lead
to discrepant associations and thus different advantages and deﬁcits.
For example, a decrease in the storage capacity or duration of SSC
might reduce working memory span but increase creative and sponta-
neous thought, facilitate reaction time, and increase attentiveness to
the environment. It may additionally result in constraint relaxation
and chunk decomposition. On the other hand, an increase in storage ca-
pacity and durationmay increase workingmemory span and speciﬁcity
of memory but necessitate a higher degree of prior network training to
produce adaptive behavior.
3.2. Associations between nonsimultaneous but causally related stimuli
Due to their sustained activity, neurons in the PFC can span a wide
delay time or input lag between associated occurrences [35,89] and
thereby allow elements of prior events to become coactive with ele-
ments of subsequent events. Sustained activity allows neurons that
would otherwise never ﬁre together to both ﬁre and wire together,
and also allows features that never co-occur in the environment to be
present together in topographic imagery. Thus, it may be reasonable
to assume that SSC underlies the brain's ability to make internally de-
rived associations between representations that never occur simulta-
neously in the environment. The longer sustained ﬁring in associationcortex lasts, the better the animal will be at capturing information
about causally linked stimuli that present apart in time. The higher the
SSC, the longer the delay can be. The same regularity may happen
persistently in the environment, where a stimulus is followed several
seconds later by another stimulus, concern, or opportunity; however,
if the animal lacks sufﬁcient SSC, this statistical regularity will not be
captured by the neocortical system because the ensembles for them
will never be exposed to each other.
Few if any mammals have evolved a human-like capacity for
sustained ﬁring in PFC neurons, and thus themental lives of most mam-
mals likely involve associations made between temporally proximate
stimuli and concepts. This may suggest that in most ecological niches
it is not helpful to create memories for relationships between stimuli
that occur in delayed succession and instead it is better to focus on an-
alyzing stimuli that present in quick succession [68,72]. There may
therefore be two strategies, on opposite ends of a continuum, for hold-
ing recent information active: immediate and delayed succession strat-
egies. The delayed succession strategy, involving high SSC and low
icSSC, is optimal for environmental scenarios that are prolonged over
time, where temporally distant cues may retain contextual relevance.
This strategy is likely associated with certain ecological or life-history
conditions such as low extrinsic mortality, intergenerational resource
ﬂows, meme transference, and the K-selection strategy in general.
How can the brain trust that an association between two concepts
that are removed in time and never co-occur simultaneously in the en-
vironment is valid? Each of the contents of SSC contribute to the selec-
tion of the next addition to SSC, and this may help to ensure that the
contents held in SSC at any moment are veridically concordant rather
than incongruous. This is because the system is narrowly constrained
to only combining ensembles that have been highly associated in the
past. If this is true, it suggests that at an early age the ﬁrst associations
are between stimuli that are nearly simultaneous, but that these can
create foundational knowledge upon which to base reliable inferences
about associations between stimuli that are removed from each other
by a delay in time.
Because the frontal lobes of infants are underdeveloped, their brains
probably exhibit far less continuity between brain states. Very young
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made concerning the spatiotemporal associations between near simul-
taneous features because these events show high order and regularity.
This may be why sensory areas myelinate so early in life. Perhaps asso-
ciation areas are programmed genetically not toﬁnishmyelinating until
early adulthood because it is a time-intensive process to form and test
higher-order hypotheses about relationships between constructs that
are more distributed through time.
The processes of icSCC and polyassociativity may work within the
brain at a number of neural levels. They probably inﬂuence network dy-
namics at the level of assemblies, ensembles, dedicated modules and
even cross-module interactions. The remainder of this article, however,
will focus on the role of icSSC and polyassociativity in representational
updating at the level of the global workspace [4,5,24]. At this point, it
is necessary to consider mental imagery and the hierarchical reciproca-
tions that construct it. The following sections frame the thinking process
as a succession of interrelated maps or images guided by a continually
updating buffer of higher-order representations that demonstrates
icSSC.4. Cortical hierarchy, topographic mappings, and mental imagery
Perceptual sensory processing is thought to be accomplished using
hierarchically arranged, nonlinear transformations [16]. The cortical
hierarchy from sensory to association cortex arises because simple
patterns converge upon second-order patterns, which in turn converge
upon third-order patterns and so on. This amounts to a hierarchy of
increasingly complex representations stretching from subsymbolic
neurons and assemblies in sensory areas to analogically symbolic
ensembles in association areas. Many pathways in the brain, such as
the ventral visual pathway, appear to use a “structurally descriptive”
architecture with “compositional syntax” in which neurons or neural
populations that encode low-level, nonaccidental features are allowed
to converge onto those that encode more abstract, higher-order,
generic, template-like features [28]. For instance, a neuron in the
retinotopically arranged primary visual area may receive inputs from a
row of contiguous upstream neurons, and interpret these adjacent
“dots” as a structurally inferred line. Downstream areas of extrastriate
visual cortex are tuned to recognize when these lines and curves come
together to create more complex visual features, eventually amounting
to the recognition of structures such as objects (inferior temporal
cortex), scenes, faces (fusiform face area), and the like [81]. It seems
that evolution tuned cortical assemblies higher in this hierarchy to ﬁre
for longer spans of time, predisposing mammals to retain high-order
generics rather than precategorical speciﬁcs.
Early sensory areas create topographic mappings from patterns rec-
ognized in the external environment, but are also thought to be able to
combine top-down inputs from higher association cortex to build inter-
nally-derived imagery [54,61]. For instance, top-down modulation by
the dorsolateral PFC has been observed to be responsible for retrieval
of viewed images in visual cortex [42], and retrieval of associativemem-
ories from inferior temporal cortex [82]. In his convergence-divergence
framework (1989), which may be largely compatible with the present
model, Damasio proposed that during recall, association cortices send
back divergent projections about the records needed to reconstruct
original perceptual maps in early sensory cortices [23]. The predictive
feedback from the template-like association ensembles (analogous to
Damasio's CDRs) may make incomplete or noisy perceptions in early
sensory cortices more complete by retroactivating generic features
(analogous to Damasio's CDZs) normally associated with the stimulus
and completing the expected pattern. A major difference between this
formulation and Damasio's is that not one, but multiple ensembles
(CDRs), exhibiting icSSC, spread divergent activity in a polyassociative
manner back toward sensory cortex to guide the construction of topo-
graphic maps.The PFC and other associative areas do not direct processing in V1 or
the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) of the thalamus (the earliest of vi-
sual processing areas), but can profoundly inﬂuence the activity in
extrastriate visual areas via re-entrant projections, which in turn inﬂu-
ence V1 [56]. Internally-derived sensory imagery, such as that seen in
the “mind's eye” probably appears topographically organized because
it is created by the same lower-order networks responsible for perceiv-
ing external stimuli. Thus it may be safe to assume that when we
visualize and imagine, we construct and manipulate maps in early per-
ceptual networks [22]. The available population of assemblies in sensory
cortex may serve as an active canvas for either the environment (via
feedforward connections) or expectation and imagination (via feedback
connections) to paint on. During perception, the bottom-up activity
may be driving and the top-downmay bemodulatory; however, during
imagination the top-down activity may be driving and the bottom-up
may be modulatory.
Themanner in which sensory areas integrate inputs when they con-
struct images is informed by reality, as they have been tuned directly by
real environmental inputs, unlike associative areas, which are tuned
indirectly by reality owing to the intervening effects of motivation,
temporal delay, and inference. The sensory areas do what association
areas cannot do on their own. They take various features and rapidly
and unconsciously integrate them into amap that conforms to strict, en-
vironmentally imposed constraints. These assumptions are consistent
with the “consolidation hypothesis,”which states thatmemory is stored
in the same areas that allow active, real-time perception and function
[60]. They are also consistent with the ﬁnding that remembering or
imagining a particular sensory construct largely activates the same
neural networks that are involved in perceiving the construct in the
environment [21].
Unlike some popular models, in the present framework, activity in
association areas does constitute imagery. Like sensory areas, their neu-
rons have become correlated with the occurrence of spatiotemporal
structure from the environment. Prefrontal areas such as the dorsolater-
al PFC likely contain ensembles that are reﬂections of experiences, albeit
abstracted postcategorical ones that are disoriented frommodality-spe-
ciﬁc topographic coordinates. Thus, purporting that association areas do
not hold true imagery, as some neuroscientists do, is akin to saying that
imagery is held in the “dots” of primary visual cortex but not in the
“contours” of secondary visual cortex. The topology of PFC imagery is
not unimodal (e.g., retinotopic) but rathermust correspond to the inter-
spersed placement of lower-order projections from various modalities,
arranged during the evolution of the frontal lobe. This suggests that
the spatial format of associative imagery can only be understood
through neurocartographic investigation of the unique connectional
geometries found in higher-order areas. Neurons near the top of the
hierarchy in areas such as the frontal pole, which seem to code for
very denselymultimodal abstractions, appear to be calibrated to sustain
their ﬁring for longer than othermore posterior neurons. Describing the
exact relationship betweenmental states and brain states will ultimate-
ly involve “functional modeling,” i.e., scrutinizing the receptive ﬁelds of
these anterior neurons, better determining which facets of our mental
lives span several seconds of time, and then matching these together.
The discrepant ﬁring properties of sensory and association cortex
make their interaction dynamic. An important attribute of this coopera-
tive system is that imagery in lower-order sensory areas can be quickly
wiped clean to accommodate a newmapping, whereas activity in asso-
ciation areas is more enduring. Early sensory cortex is thought to have
its own very-short-term memory called “sensory memory.” Sensory
memory has been shown to hold more information than does working
memory, but it does so very transiently [2,3,79]. Crick and Koch [21] ad-
vocated that a helpful way to consider the reciprocal activity between
sensory and association areas is to imagine that the front of the brain
is “looking at” the sensory systems in the back of the brain. This would
be similar to watching a television program that can depict ideas and
conceptualizations. This retinotopic “screen” may be able to perform
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jects with their respective traits [84]. However, the TV analogy does
not greatly reduce the problem at hand because it depicts association
cortex as another kind of conscious entity that “watches” the TV. The
next section will attempt to show how icSSC allows the interaction be-
tween association and sensory cortex to amount to more than the rela-
tionship between a homunculus and a “Cartesian Theater.”
4.1. Top-down to bottom-up transformations, and progressive imagery
modiﬁcation
Object recognition, associative recall, planning, decision making and
other important cognitive processes involve two-way signal activity
among various neuralmaps that stretch transversely through the cortex
from early sensory areas to late association areas [50]. Bottom-up
sensory areas deliver ﬂeeting sensory information, whereas top-down
association areas deliver lasting perceptual expectations in the form of
templates or prototypes. During recognition and recall, these two
systems may determine category belongingness by constantly
comparing their respective outputs [12]. These exchanges involve
feedforward and feedback (recurrent) connections in the corticocortical
and thalamocortical systems that bind topographic information from
lower-order sensory maps with dispositional information from
higher-order maps. These bindings form synchronous constellations of
activity, often presenting in the gamma range, which can remain stable
for tens or hundreds of milliseconds [21].
icSSC inﬂuences this reciprocating crosstalk. These reciprocations
may create progressive sequences of related thoughts, speciﬁcally be-
cause the topographic maps generated by lower-order sensory areas
are guided by the enduring representations that are held active in asso-
ciation areas [69–71]. Because they are drawing from a register with
sustained contents, sequential images formed in sensory areas have
similar subject matter and thus can be expected to be symbolically or
semiotically related to one another. It is probable that the higher the
SSC, themore related two sequential sensory images can be on average.Fig. 5. Depiction of the reciprocal transformations of information between lower-order sensory
Sensory areas can create only one topographic map at a time, whereas association areas hold tAlso, association areasmaintain representations from not only themost
recent topographic mapping but also from several recent topographic
maps produced in sensory areas (Fig. 5).
SSC and recurrent processing make it possible for current states to
spill over into subsequent states, creating the context for them in a re-
cursive fashion. This creates a cyclical, nested ﬂow of information pro-
cessing marked by icSSC (Fig. 6). In a sense, each new topographic
map is embedded in the previous one. This formof hierarchical crosstalk
could be termed “progressive imagery modiﬁcation.” The same general
process may take place in language areas and be responsible for the in-
ternal monologue. This process could similarly drive the progression of
complex behavior in that the motor-relevant representations that pass
in and out of SSC impose iterative constraints on motor commands,
and thereby regulate the animal's preparatory set, action sequencing,
and planning behavior.
Feedback activation from top-down association areas passes speciﬁ-
cations to early sensory cortex for use in imagery building. Disparate
chunks of information are integrated into a plausiblemap and transient-
ly bound together. This suggests that one can immediately visualize the
relationship between two abstract representations only if one already
has implicit information in the visual cortex about how to integrate
them into a single image. This integrative process may be very rapid
and use the structurally descriptive perceptual hierarchy in reverse to
go from abstractions to speciﬁcs. In the opposite direction, the
topographic bindings of the map are “disintegrated” as feedforward
activation from bottom-up sensory areas converges upon relevant
assemblies in association cortex. After this “fast feedforward sweep,”
the PFC and association areas could be protagonized as “saying” the
following: “We have identiﬁed the important features from the last
bottom-up image and combined them with the other features that
we've been holding online from previous images. Let's engage in anoth-
er round of imagery generation, this time with more emphasis on the
salient elements from the last image. It should be informative to see
how the visual system combines this updated set of higher-order fea-
tures into another, composite, topographical map. Perhaps this nextmaps and higher-order association area ensembles during internally generated thought.
he salient or goal-relevant features of several sequential maps at the same time.
Fig. 6.Depiction of icSSC enabling progressive imagerymodiﬁcation. 1) Representations B, C, D, and E, which are held active in association areas, all spread their activation energy to early
visual cortex, where a composite image is built that is based on prior experience with these representations. 2) Features involved in the topographic imagery from time sequence 1
converge on the PFC neurons responsible for F. B drops out of activation, and C, D, E and F remain active and diverge back onto visual cortex. 3) The same process leads to G being
activated and D being deactivated, mirroring the pattern of activity shown in Fig. 4.
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quent cycles.”
The rapid, rhythmic oscillations of information between sensory and
association areas allow them to learn from each other and integrate
their knowledge like two people in conversation. The fact that they
have fundamentally different perspectives makes the “conversation”
dynamic and informative for both of them due to the lack of redundan-
cy. The crosstalk is similar to that between two specialists in related
areas, interrogating each other about the nature of their common inter-
ests. One of these specialists speaks ﬁguratively and keeps a list of pre-
vious topics on hand; the other is a literalist and approaches each turn in
the conversation with an unbiased, almost amnesic approach.
Sensory areas may use the speciﬁcations handed down from associ-
ation areas to generate appropriate imagery, but they probably often
elaborate on what they have been given with closely associated but un-
foreseeable embellishments. This would be expected given that the cre-
ation of these maps involves polyassociativity and constitutes “novel
convergence events.” The unspeciﬁed, extemporized features built
into early imagery probably provide much new content for the stream
of thought. For example, if higher-order nodes come to hold features
supporting the representations for “pink,” “rabbit,” and “drum,” then
the subsequent mappings in lower-order visual nodes may activate
representations for a well-known battery advertisement, and the audi-
tory nodes may activate the representation for the word “Energizer
Bunny.” Thus, the concept of a battery might be introduced into the
thought process in an unconscious, polyassociative manner, despite
the fact that none of the previous concepts alone had any close associa-
tions with batteries. The mental imagery that is generated mayconstitute only a slight modiﬁcation to the previous imagery or may
be a paradigm shift away from it; however, unless the focus of attention
shifts dramatically, it is likely that many of the high-order representa-
tions will remain in SSC.
In reality, association areas have much more to converse with than
simply a single retinotopic map as depicted in Fig. 6. In fact, they feed
their speciﬁcations to and receive specialized input from dozens of
known topographic mapping areas [48]. Relative to Baddeley's model
of working memory [7,8], this relationship is congruent with that of
the central executive and its “slave systems” such as the visuospatial
sketchpad and the phonological (articulatory) loop. Areas of various
modalities are constantly responding to incoming activity in an attempt
to pull up themost context-appropriatemap in their repertoire. Further
compounding the complexity, the sensory modules that build these
maps take speciﬁcations not only from association areas but also from
other sensory modules [50]. Moreover, motor and premotor modules
give speciﬁcations to and receive speciﬁcations from this common
workspace while building their musculotopic imagery for movement.
Thus, association areasmay utilize icSSC to direct progressive sequences
of mental imagery in a large number of topographic sensory and motor
modules (Fig. 7). Distinct regions of association cortex can be thought of
as specializedmodules that regulate this workspace in distinct fashions.
This frames the brain as a system of numerous interactingmodules that
are each generating a topological mapping that is their most internally
consistent, composite interpretation of the other module's mappings.
Because the postcategorical and multimodal modules have neurons
that ﬁre for sustained periods, they are better positioned to direct this
activity through time.
Fig. 7. Incoming information frommotor and sensory cortices enters the focus of attentionwhere it can then inﬂuence other sensory andmotor cortices. The arrow on the far left indicates
that as time passes, representations in the focus of attention decay toward a less active form of short-termmemory fromwhich point they can 1) reenter the focus of attention, 2) spread
their instructions to sensory and motor cortex, or 3) deactivate and return to inert long-term memory.
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A very simple and inﬂexible caricature of icSSCwas suggested by the
tank tread analogy and Fig. 2. The dynamics are better captured by an
analogy involving an octopus grabbing and releasing footholds as it
pulls itself from place to place. This is an activity known as “sea ﬂoor
walking.” The analogy illustrates that the thought process involves the
simultaneous coactivation of several representations at a time (multiple
footholds held by an octopus) as well as the deactivation of previously
active representations (the releasing of footholds), and the activation
of previously inactive representations (the placement of an arm on a
new foothold). This analogy may be valuable because it depicts a sys-
tem, that even a child can understand, where speciﬁc representations
are conserved through time as others are actively repositioned. This
shares attributes with Edelman and Tononi's [29] conceptualization of
a “functional cluster” or “dynamic core,” where reentrant neuronal in-
teractions yield a succession of differentiated yet unitary metastable
states, and with Varela's conception of dynamic links mediated by syn-
chrony over multiple frequency bands [85].
In the present analogy, each octopus arm corresponds to an active
ensemble, and the suction cups on each arm can be taken to correspond
with the assemblies that comprise the ensemble, while the grains of
sand under each suction cup represent active cortical neurons. Fig. 8 of-
fers a hypothetical example of icSSC that, though contrived, is more re-
alistic than the emblematic example of Fig. 2.
The “octopus” has a limited and ﬁxed number of arms, so it must re-
lease footholds to free up tentacles to grab new footholds. Similarly, our
workingmemory has a limited capacity and is constantly forced to real-
locate its bioelectrical and hemodynamic resources [18]. Coincidentally,
the number of representational chunks (psychologically perceptible
units of perception and meaning) that can be held in working memo-
ry—7 plus or minus 2 by some estimates [58]—neatly coincides with
the number of tentacles on an octopus.
I do not mean to suggest that the sustained ﬁring involved in the
focus of attention and the working memory system is fully responsible
for mental continuity. Cortical priming, early LTP, the slow action of
neuromodulators, emotional priming, and the hippocampus must
each make unique contributions to continuity as well. Take primingfor instance. Cortical nodes recently used in the focus of attention
maintain above-baseline activity, and contribute to non-hippocampal
dependent short-term memory [13,88]. These primed nodes also must
contribute to imagery and polyassociativity because of the way they
continue to spread their activation energy within the cortical network.
Episodic pattern completionmade possible by the hippocampus [53]
must make similar, independent contributions to the mental continuity
that we experience. The conceptual recurrences that the hippocampus
makes possible may lend a continuity to consciousness in the same
way that a motif (a distinctive and recurring form) gives coherency to
a literary, artistic, or musical work. Sustained ﬁring and short-term syn-
aptic plasticitymay allow a formof “short-term continuity” on the order
of milliseconds to seconds, whereas priming, early LTP, and emotions
may allow an “intermediate-term continuity” on the order of seconds
to hours, while late LTP and the episodic memory of the hippocampus
may allow “long-term continuity” on the order of minutes to years.
6. Unconscious processes demonstrating icSSC result in executive
function
In cognitive psychology, dual process theory suggests that implicit
and explicit processes use two fundamentally different cognitive pro-
cessing architectures: system 1 and system 2 [63]. System 1 is implicit,
automatic, and unconscious. It operates quickly, effortlessly and has a
large capacity [74]. System 2 is explicit, controlled, and conscious. It
operates with effort and has a smaller capacity [30]. These two systems
are thought to be subserved by distinct neural substrates [49], although
theymay share the same general neuroanatomical foundation. It is pos-
sible that system 2 is actually system 1 exhibiting icSSC [70]. That is,
what is referred to as system 2 may simply be the processing architec-
ture of system 1 (top-down to bottom-up reciprocations within the
thalamocortical hierarchy) implementing the same suite of representa-
tions for a prolonged period. Again, system 1 is making automatic, intu-
itive,ﬂash judgments; however, because of SSC, these rapid associations
are able to support each other in a progressive and additive manner.
Rather than arriving at a judgment about something based on a sin-
gle impulse, system 2may involve the sequential arrangement of sever-
al impulses that cooperatively, lead to a higher-order judgment. For
Fig. 8. A hypothetical distribution of ensembles held in the focus of attention of SSC. Unlike Fig. 2, the order of entry does not rigidly determine the order of exit. Here, there are 7
representational constructs (rather than 4) that can be maintained. Representations C and F demonstrate continuity over all 5 time intervals. Representation G enters during time 1, is
deactivated during time 2, then reenters during time 5. Representations that remained active until time 5 are shown in red.
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that involves a series of system 1 impulses coordinated to implement a
learned pattern of algorithmic steps. All learned mental operations
probably have distinct, predeﬁned algorithmic sequences of topological
mappings that must be completed in sequence to achieve the solution.
Each brain state would correspond to a different step in the algorithm,
and because each was trained to do so, its activity would recruit the
next step.
System 2 cognition may be involved in a mental task whenever en-
sembles related to the task exhibit sustained ﬁring and are utilized in
progressive imagery modiﬁcation, culminating in sensory imagery or
motor output that could not be informed by any of the intermediate
steps alone, or that is capable of solving a problem too difﬁcult for any
system 1 process itself. For example, early processes may provide pre-
mises or propositional stances that can be used algorithmically (e.g., syl-
logistically) to induce or justify a conclusion in subsequent processes.
Perhaps reciprocating activity between the SSC updating system and
the imagery generation systems produces sequences of interrelated
mental images that build upon and provide scaffolding for one another
to form logical deductions and abductive expectations.
This preparatory modeling process may employ learned rules and
schemas to actively test relationships between higher-order represen-
tations. Associations that are perceived as, or deemed to be, valid may
then be saved to memory. This has the effect of training the initial im-
pulses in advance, inﬂuencing future behavior without necessitating
that the scenario be modeled again. Researchers in psychology suggest
that system2processes are initiated bymotivation, surprise, and curios-
ity [30]. Of course these are the same three factors involved in recruiting
themesocortical dopamine systemnecessary for the sustained ﬁring re-
sponsible for mental continuity. So, is there a fundamental equivalency
between conscious processes and unconscious ones? Perhaps con-
sciousness andmetacognitive processing can be reduced to preattentive
processing in which certain ensembles exhibit SSC over successive in-
stances of imagery generation. This may afford the executive system
the capacity to handle novel situations outside the domain of automatic
processes, prepotent responses, and set behaviors.
7. Implications for artiﬁcial intelligence
The present model may have implications for structuring artiﬁcial in-
telligence (AI) architectures. There are existing computing architectureswith limited forms of recursion in which the current state is a function
of the previous state and active data are entered into a limited capacity
buffer to inform other processes. However, there are no AI systems in
which this buffer is multimodal and positioned at the top of a hierarchi-
cal system so that it can inform and interact with topographicmaps in a
recursive and polyassociative manner. The model described here could
be used to inform the construction of a multimodular, neural network
architecture that harnesses icSSC for use in pattern recognition, analyt-
ics, prediction, adaptive control, decision making, and response to
query.
The program would be composed of several highly interconnected
multilayer neural networks of pattern-recognizing nodes organized
into a hierarchical architecture similar to that of the mammalian neo-
cortex. The multiple interfacing neural networks would be arranged
biomimetically, i.e., connected and tuned to simulate sensory and asso-
ciation cortices (Fig. 9). Like neural assemblies, the nodes would exhibit
a continuous gradient from low-order nodes that code for sensory
features (and serve in feature extraction) to high-order nodes that are
designed to capture and encode temporally or spatially extended rela-
tionships between such features. In each sensory network, nodes
would operate both “competitively” and “cooperatively” to build “self-
organizing” topographic maps. Nodes higher in the hierarchy would
be increasingly multimodal, and have larger capacity for sustained ac-
tivity. These nodes would identify and sustain pertinent, high-level fea-
tures over elapsing time. Prioritized features could be used to guide the
construction of topographic maps as well as the construction of natural
language and robotic movement. Properly implemented, the architec-
ture should feature the aspects of both Kohonen andHopﬁeld networks,
backpropagation/bidirectionality, and Hebbian learning as well as a
combination of principal-components learning and competitive learn-
ing. Replicating icSSC using deep learning algorithms couldmake it pos-
sible for large multimodal neural networks to recognize invariant
patterns whose components are distributed across time. This capacity
may then allow them to ﬁnd high-order structure in unlabeled data, in-
tegrate abstract knowledge, and perform logical inferences in uncertain
environments.
If the sustained activity of higher-order nodes was programmed to
persist for extended intervals, the system could exhibit a superhuman
capacity for continuity (Fig. 10). This could amplify the ability of the
network to make associations between causally linked but temporally
distant representations, and allow its processing and actions to be
Fig. 9. A plausible biomimetic arrangement of interfacing neural networks. Black lines indicate massive connectivity.
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imagery that is created to be informed by a larger number of parame-
ters, and ensure that important features were not omitted simply
because their activity could not be sustained due to biologicalFig. 10. Three examples of sustained ﬁring in a neural network. The ﬁgure compares the numb
humanwith frontal lobe dysfunction, and in a hypothetical AI agent. The AI agent canmaintain
in t1 will be informed by a larger amount of recent information.limitations. To operate meaningfully, and reduce its propensity for rec-
ognizing “false patterns,” such an ultraintelligent system would re-
quire extensive supervised training and unsupervised machine
learning.er of nodes that have remained active until the present time (t1), in a normal human, in a
a larger number of nodes over a longer time span, ensuring that its perceptions and actions
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The model presented here is qualitative and exploratory, contains
unveriﬁed assumptions, and makes untested claims. A more complete
discussion could focus on better integration of existing knowledge
from clinical neuropsychology, the sustained ﬁring behavior of cortical
columns, the functional neuroanatomy of working memory, and the
cognitive neuroscience of attention. In the absence of pertinent data
and related literature this article attempts to introduce new perspec-
tives using plausible, convergent reasoning. The model is intended to
inspire more detailed hypotheses that can be tested experimentally,
and against already-existing experimental data. Further research
should search for the distinct neural signature of icSCC (see Figs. 1, 2
and 8) within the brain. This search for the icSCC signal should involve
extensive time series analyses of simultaneous recordings, on
submillisecond time scales, from small groups of neurons, in many
places in the brain. It is not clear how the neurobiological substrate of
mental continuity should be best examined, but it is reassuring that
there are diverse disciplines which use advanced methodologies to
track, analyze and predict the evolution of gradual changes in complex,
dynamic systems, including population genetics, geology, material sci-
ence, and meteorology.
Crick and Koch [21] have advocated that neuroscientists should con-
centrate on ﬁnding the “neural correlates of consciousness,” deﬁned as
the minimal set of brain mechanisms and events sufﬁcient for some
speciﬁc phenomenal state. icSSC as described heremay be a strong can-
didate for a neural correlate of consciousness. The reasoning here sug-
gests a consideration of consciousness as an elaborative process,
where the longer a set of representations is maintained within SSC,
themore conscious one becomes of that subset. icSSCmay be necessary
to form higher-order, or transitive, representations (i.e., a representa-
tion of a representation), and thus may be necessary for active self-
awareness. In other words, self-consciousness may necessitate that
common notions about the autobiographical self remain in SSC, where
they help to direct the progression of images and impulses. Qualia
(i.e., instances of subjective conscious experience)may gain their expe-
riential qualities when the features of a quale are maintained in SSC,
volleyed between association and sensory areas, and used to uncover
apposite memories and images. This processes could be conceptualized
as “phenomenal continuity.”
The present line of thinkingmay cause us to ask: 1) whether icSSC
could be used to quantify the extent of consciousness in animals or in
coma/vegetative state, 2) whether icSSC is necessary for human-
level intelligence in machines, and 3) what form of phenomenal ex-
perience or sentience an entity could possess if it exhibited no icSSC.
Even though mental continuity and icSSC may resemble conscious-
ness in some respects, they are certainly not identical to it, and con-
sciousness must involve a number of additional phenomena and
conditions.
Suppose that…we take half a dozen glances at a strange and curious
ﬂower. We have not as many complex presentations which we
might symbolise as F1, F2, F3. But rather, at ﬁrst, only the general
outline is noted, next the disposition of petals, stamen, etc., then
the attachment of the anthers, formof the ovary, and so on… It is be-
cause the earlier apprehensions persist that the later are an advance
upon them and an addition to them.
John Locke [52]
The fact that “earlier apprehensions” persist makes them immedi-
ately available to contribute to the formation of later, more complex ap-
prehensions. Newly attended stimuli create gradual, progressive
modiﬁcations to the elements held in SSC as the series advances, and in-
terrelated perceptions accumulate. A new impression in this series may
be irrelevant, or instrumental, or anything in between. Sometimes the
ﬁnal construct in such a compiled series produces the effect necessaryto reframe all of the preceding stimuli, creating an end product that
was unforeseeable before its entry.
Swiftly the headmass becomes an enchanted loomwheremillions of
ﬂashing shuttlesweave a dissolving pattern, always ameaningful pat-
tern though never an abiding one; a shifting harmony of subpatterns.
Charles Sherrington [78]
I like to think that Sherrington's dissolving pattern may directly cor-
respond to the gradually transforming distribution of temporarily
sustained representations in icSSC. This purely biological process that si-
multaneously exhibits both deterioration and accretion underlies our
ability to transition between closely related thoughts and may consti-
tute the physical “fabric” of consciousness. Whether a series of actions,
words, or musical notes, each is delivered separately in its own discrete
span of time, but our brain's capacity for SSC allows us to knit these tem-
porally isolated stimuli together into performances, speeches, and mel-
odies. Merging such a group of occurrences as if they occurred
simultaneously permits the use of the entire series at once to search
for related memories. This attribute, permits mammals to weave to-
gether threads of isolated, objective occurrences into a continuous tap-
estry of subjective experience.References
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